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The Neoliberal Myth in Latin America: The Cases of Mexico and 
Argentina in the ‘90s 
Summary 
During the ‘90s most Latin American countries were submitted to neoliberal structural 
reform policies. Neoliberal policies imposed market supremacy, reduced the State’s role 
in the economy and deregulated the markets. This paper aims at describing how these 
policies affected the most important macroeconomic indexes, with special emphasis on 
Argentina and Mexico, the two countries that suffered most from the economic crises of 
the ‘80s and ‘90s, and where the neoliberal policies were applied with greater 
orthodoxy. In spite of a slight improvement in some macroeconomic indexes, in Latin 
America neoliberalism failed to reduce poverty and unemployment, and was unable to 
guarantee a fair distribution of the wealth and improve welfare. 
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“No puede decirse que hay hoy una historia de 
América Latina sino una historia del mundo y 
de sus transformaciones generales que toman 






Starting from the second half of the ‘80s, the agenda of Latin American governments was 
dominated by a wave of structural reform policies aimed at the radical transformation of the 
economic institutions established after World War II. These structural reforms were the result of 
two parallel developments. The first was the “adjustment” (ajuste) process that had been initiated 
because of the acute economic emergency following the foreign debt crisis. The unsuccessful 
attempts to correct the macroeconomic problems with short-term “adjustments” increased the 
pressure for stronger and radical solutions. As far as political proposals are concerned, there was 
growing consensus for the neoliberal position that permeated the dominant economic thought of the 
international financial institutions and governmental circles of the creditor countries.  
Neoliberal policies were based on a set of principles such as market supremacy – either national or 
international, depending on the case – as the main, if not exclusive, means to redistribute resources, 
reduce the State’s role in the economy and deregulate the markets of goods and services, labour and 
capitals.  
The debate between political scientists and analysts, that had started in the ‘90s, ended with 
positions definitely in favour of neoliberalism. 
These policies were formally collected in the so-called “Washington Consensus”: a set of principles 
and economic policy measures formulated by John Williamson in the early ‘90s. It relied on the 
support of the international financial institutions and on the enthusiastic backing of the region’s 
conventional political parties.  
From this perspective, the macroeconomic imbalances of Latin American countries were caused by 
the limitations and dysfunctions of the development model oriented towards the internal market and 
promoted by the State. The Baker Plan
2 of 1986 gave credit to this analysis and defended the 
                                                 
1 Touraine A., Mutaciones de América Latina, in: “Revista Sociedad”, n. 2, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales (UBA), 
Buenos Aires, May 1993, p. 5 
2 The Baker Plan, named after U.S. Treasury Secretary John Baker who launched it in 1985. The plan requested new 
credits for the countries unable to honour old debts, stating that countries that could not pay in cash could transfer 
participation shares or properties of resources and enterprises.   3
rationalisation and the reduction of State interventionism in the economy, as well as greater 
integration in the world economy.  
These proposals – the search of solutions fostering economic integration by Latin American 
governments and the structural “adjustment” programs recommended by the multilateral credit 
agencies – eventually converged on an urgent issue: the demand and supply of foreign financial aid. 
The conventional clauses present in the loans granted by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank thus became a means through which market reforms were added to the governments’ 
agendas. One after the other, Latin American countries started to implement deep changes aimed at 
reducing the State’s historical role in promoting development and in modifying the conventional 
balance between the national and foreign market.  
Although the orientation of the economic changes was quite similar, the extent and pace of their 
implementation was predictably different, each country having started the change in peculiar 
economic and political conditions. 
For this reason this paper is devoted to the description of the macroeconomic trend of the most 
important countries of South America, with special emphasis on the two economies that suffered 
most from the financial crises of the ‘90s: Mexico and Argentina. 
Mexico, at the end of 1987, and Argentina, in early 1991, adopted strict stabilisation measures 
aimed at controlling their high inflation rate. The Mexican Pacto de Solidaridad Ecónomica
3 fixed 
an initial exchange rate followed by adjustment within a “range”
4, and the Argentine Plan de 
Convertibilidad, based on a fixed exchange rate, relied on the exchange rate as the main political 
tool to fight inflation. The Ley de Convertibilidad
5, supported by the new law of the Central Bank, 
imposed strict limits to the monetary policy and established a 100% international reserves guarantee 
for the monetary base
6. 
These stabilisation programs were accompanied or followed by relevant economic reforms. In 
Mexico trade liberalisation started in 1985 with the cut in the import restrictions of capitals and 
intermediate goods. It continued in 1998 with the liberalisation of the imports of consumer goods. 
As of January 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada 
(NAFTA) changed the institutional structure of the flows of trade and capital within the North 
American area. In 1988 Argentina started to gradually reduce the customs tariffs. In the ‘90s 
                                                 
3 The Pacto de Solidaridad Económica (PSE) of December 1987 adjusted public expenditure, accelerated privatisations, 
cut import taxes, implemented the controlled devaluation of the peso and an emergency increase of the minimum salary. 
4 Krauze E., La presidencia imperial. Ascenso y caída del sistema político mexicano (1940-1996), Tusquets, México 
D.F., 1997, p. 436 
5The Ley de Convertibilidad was applied in Argentina in 1991. A fixed peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate was enforced 
and the emission of money by the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina was strictly reduced. 
6 Gerchunoff P. e Torre J. C., La politíca de liberalización económica en la administración Menem in: “Desarrollo 
económico”, vol. 36, n. 143, ottobre-dicembre 1996, pp. 745-746   4
Argentina passed from a policy of gradual change to open trade. Tariffs were reduced from an 
average 26.5% in October 1989 to 9.7% in April 1991. A number of specific taxes and import 
quantity restrictions were abolished at the same time. Financial trade flows were completely 
liberalised following the approval of the Ley de Convertibilidad in April 1991.) Equality treatment 
for national and foreign investments was also established
7. 
Other economic reforms accompanied the stabilisation programs based on trade liberalisation with 
an appreciation of the exchange rate in the ‘90s. Mexico’s economy was liberalised at a faster rate 
under the Salinas administration (December 1988–December 1994) with the privatisation of state-
owned banks and enterprises and with the liberalisation of the financial system. In Argentina the 
Menem administration (December 1989–December 1999) initiated a radical privatisation program. 
The process involved a broad range of activities (oil, communications, railroad, energy and state-
owned airlines) and by 1994 most of the state-owned enterprises had been privatised. 
These reforms generated massive capital flows, especially as financial investments. In Latin 
America, Mexico and Argentina were amongst the greatest recipients of capital flows between 1990 
and 1993. In Mexico, the main recipient, the capital flow was followed in 1994 by an abrupt 
contraction that led to the devaluation of the peso in December of that same year, followed by a 
deep crisis. The crisis in Mexico had a strong impact throughout Latin America. In 1995 Argentina 
experienced a massive flight of capital and a severe financial and economic crisis
8. 
The macroeconomic policies of the two countries clearly diverged in the second half of the ‘90s.  
An initially undervalued peso, under a fluctuating exchange rate regime, predominated in Mexico. 
In Argentina the Ley de Convertibilidad produced growing appreciation, especially compared to the 
depreciated currency of its main trade partners, in particular of Brazil at the beginning of 1999
9. The 
rapid growth of exports in Mexico until 2001 made a tax pressure increase necessary and 
contributed to the drop of the debt/exports ratio, that had already been greatly reduced for the 
privatisations of the early ‘90s
10. 
The first part of this paper is focused on the critical analysis, from a neoliberal perspective, of other 
development models implemented in Latin America starting from the ‘30s (shedding light on the  
principles of neoliberalism), with special emphasis on the “desarollista” (developmentalist) model 
of the ‘70s. The second part is centred on the conditions of the different Latin American countries in 
                                                 
7 Buscaglia A. E., La economía argentina a fines del siglo XX, in: Marcelo R. Lascano (a cura di), La economía 
argentina hoy, El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 2001, pp. 56-57 
8 Sevares J., Por qué cayó la Argentina. Imposición, crisis y reciclaje del orden neoliberal, Grupo Norma, Buenos 
Aires, 2002, p. 62 
9 Eggers-Brass T., Historia argentina (1806-2004). Una mirada crítica, Maipue, Ituzaingó (Buenos Aires), 2004, pp. 
673-674 
10 Casares E. and Sobarzo H. (editors), Diez años del TLCAN en México. Una perspectiva analítica, Fondo de cultura 
económica, México D.F., 2004, p. 156   5
the ‘90s versus the main macroeconomic indicators and structural reforms. Finally, the conclusive 
section of this paper will analyse the results of neoliberalism in Latin America, focusing on the 
economies of Mexico and Argentina as the most virtuous models in the early part of the ‘90s (1990-
1993), and as the most adversely affected in the years following the 1994 crisis.  
 
 
1. The first liberal experiments in Cono Sur 
 
In Latin America the early ‘70s marked the decline of the “desarrollista” approach, characterised by 
State interventionism as a model of development. The crisis of this strategy, that had led to high 
inflation levels, had elicited criticism from neoliberal analysts who believed it to be responsible for 
the economic and social situation of those years. 
The countries that suffered most from the crisis where those in the Cono Sur area (Argentina, 
Uruguay and Chile), whose GNP between 1945 and 1970 grew by only 3.5% compared to the 6.2% 
growth in the rest of the subcontinent. 
The particular economic, political and social situation of these countries, disrupted by revolutionary 
movements, encouraged the return of inflexible and repressive military dictatorships that enforced 
the economic and social policies inherent in neoliberal postulates and, in the opinion of Torcuato Di 
Tella, tailored to the interests of the national and international bourgeoisie. 
According to neoliberal principles, the poor development of the region had to be attributed to State 
interventionism in the economy, which had characterised the previous policies.  
The disastrous effects of the crisis of the ‘30s in Latin America showed that economic liberalism 
was unable to solve the severe historical problems of Latin American economies. The policies that 
could have been useful to deal with the crisis of the ‘30s - which was attributed to a generalised fall 
in demand – were destined to fail when transformed into development strategies, the neoliberals 
maintained, because in the long run the main negative characteristic of the underdeveloped 
countries was insufficient productivity rather than lack of demand.   
The strategy of “development towards the internal market” or “import-substituting industrialisation” 
(ISI model) was applied in order to deal with the crisis. This was the main strategy adopted in the 
area from the late ‘30s to the early ‘50s. It was followed by the “desarrollista” policy promoted by 
the Comisión Económica para la América Latina -CEPAL – that increased the State’s participation   6
in economic activity as incentive to achieve industrialisation and stop the exports of raw materials, 
typical of the area.
11. 
While these economic policies succeeded in giving industrialisation a key role in economic growth 
in the ‘30s, they led to a decrease in the level of exports and, consequently, foreign currencies, and 
to the subsequent crisis of the balance of payments. An attempt to solve this problem was the 
increase of State control over the imports and capital movements. In order to fight inflation the 
State fixed the prices granting priority to indispensable consumer goods. 
At that time this strategy represented an attempt to meet the accumulation requirements within the 
social relations of capitalist production.  
Based on the analysis of previous development strategies, neoliberalists maintained that the State’s 
growing interventionism in the economy had substituted the market as the main mechanism for the 
redistribution of resources. This disincentive to private initiative had fostered capital accumulation 
through an expansive monetary policy causing high inflation levels. Moreover, because of its 
political involvement, the State was an inefficient entrepreneur and its participation had thus slowed 
down the subcontinent’s development. 
In short, the abolition of State participation, the strengthening of the private sector, the restoration 
of the market’s role, the reprivatisation of the economy and the start of an open production, 
commercial and financial policy were the essential features of the neoliberal strategy to achieve the 
objectives of monetary and balance of payments stability, excellent resources redistribution, 
international competitiveness and the cancellation of public deficits
12. Two objectives were 
priorities in the neoliberal view: the creation of a market friendly scenario and the control of right 
prices. 
Trimming the State’s role is therefore essential. The State should limit its functions to defence, 
government administration and expenses control for some social programs, but above all it should 
protect the main rule of the model: the market must be free to function.
13. 
The State’s management of the economy and of the state-owned enterprises is inefficient. Based on 
neoliberal principles the private sector, characterised by private firms and personal initiative, is the 
main agent of production. This means that the economy must be totally privatised.   
The private sector will also be subjected to a rule: efficiency. The competitive private enterprises 
will remain on the market, the inefficient ones will be excluded. 
                                                 
11 Coraggio J. L., Territorio en transición. Crítica a la planificación regional en América Latina, Ciudad, Centro de 
investigaciones, Quito, 1988, pp. 145-152 
12 Dos Santos T., Neoliberalismo: doctrina y política, in “Comercio exterior”, n. 117, gennaio-febbraio 1999, p. 507 
13 Orlansky D., El concepto de desarrollo y las reformas estatales: visiones de los noventa, in: Tercer congreso 
argentino de administración publica, Congreso argentino de administración publica, 2-4 giugno 2005, San Migule de 
Tucúman, p. 15-18   7
The final objective is thus an economic system, regulated by the laws of the market and without the 
state’s intervention in the economy, that will promote economic growth based on the efficiency of 
the private sector. 
Even though the neoliberal criticism of the previous development models referred to some real 
events in the Latin American economy, it was selective in terms of the strategic neoliberal interests 
in economic, political and social issues. 
During the neoliberal experiments in the Cono Sur area, the abolition of political freedom and the 
militarisation of the State were necessary to establish a “strong” State, able to guarantee the 
economic and social organisation, based on the non intervention of the State and market 
functioning.
14. Moreover, in the ‘70s the Cono Sur countries were threatened by the possibility of 
important social changes. 
The afore-mentioned efficiency objective was used to achieve not only the transformation of the 
State but of society as a whole. Here, reference is made to the internal domination mechanisms that 
were fully expressed in the so-called “national security doctrine”
15, conceived with the aim of 
eliminating social demands and limiting as much as possible the forms of democratic expression, 
not only of the working class but of national capitalists. 
The steely authoritarian regimes of Argentina and Chile did all they could to change the roots of  
the productive structure, social composition and predominating values of their national 
communities, with the hope of generating a capitalist model of development in Latin America. The 
State had thus acquired absolute political control. It rejected the pressures of society, with the 
exception of those coming from the sectors in power. An essential function was anyway guaranteed: 
the functioning of a complex structure of disparities and the control over the (disciplinary) 
integration of society
16. 
The trimming of public expenditure, the decrease of State participation in the control and 
development of private activities and the privatisation of production activities as a basis for the 
efficiency of the model, limited the State’s importance as an economic agent and, consequently, its 
function as a promoter of development. 
The free prices game, determined by supply and demand, must be the best way to distribute the 
available resources in the general interest. The participation of the private sector in the economy 
must therefore be enhanced and State interventionism reduced. This will lead to the confirmation of 
the market’s role as the driving force of economic growth. 
                                                 
14 Ibidem, p. 522 
15 Bustos Ramírez J., Estructura juridica y estado en América Latina, in: Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Caminos de la 
democracia en América Latina, Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1984, pp. 225-228  
16 Rapoport M. e collaboratori, Historia económica, política y social de la Argentina (1880-2000), Ariel, Buenos Aires, 
2006, pp. 616-623   8
This implies the need to establish open policies in terms of production, trade and finance, and to 
reprivatise and reorganise the economy for the accumulation and redistribution of the international 
capital
17. 
The promoters and supporters of neoliberalism for Latin America have underlined the advantages of 
the private market, minimising its limits and excluding any shortcomings. 
This assumption omits the possibility that converging private interests might exclude the 
satisfaction of basic needs shared by society as a whole, representing the broad range of individual 
interests of different social classes. This was one of the weaknesses of the doctrine and a high social 




1.2 A liberalised economic system 
 
As described above, from the neoliberal perspective, the need to create a “strong” State capable of 
applying the “rules of the game” and ensuring market functioning, was followed by the need to 
privatise the economy and  to enforce an economic policy based on open production, financial and 
commercial terms.  
The main objective of price liberalisation was to convert the market into the only instrument for the  
distribution of resources and increase of production efficiency. 
The goal was thus to increase the level of efficiency and competitivity by using the competitive 
advantages of the market.  
Within the neoliberal strategy, the external sector plays a key role. The State is far too politically 
involved to promote and identify the strategic areas. For this reason, the competitive advantages of 
the market represent a decisive reference point for the redistribution of the resources.  
The reconversion of the productive processs is aimed at achieving these competitive advantages in 
order to increase the efficiency of the national industry
19. The period following World War II was 
marked by the application of the Marshall Plan, from 1945 to 1950, and by the Bretton Woods 
agreements (1944),  that established the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB). In accordance with these agreements each country had to maintain the exchange 
rate of its currency within a fixed value. This system was applied from 1944 to 1971. 
                                                 
17 Cuello R., La decada de los noventa: profundación en el marco de una recesión estructural, in: Lascano M. R. 
(editor), La económia argentina de hoy, El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 2001, pp. 119-139 
18 Grassi E., Políticas y problemas sociales en la sociedad neoliberal. La otra década infame, Espacio Editorial, Buenos 
Aires, 2003, pp. 32-35 
19 Wolfe M., Enfoques del desarrollo: ¿de quién y hacia qué? , in: Cincuenta años de pensamiento en la CEPAL: textos 
seleccionados, Fondo de Cultura Económica Chile S.A., Santiago del Chile, 1998, pp. 717-719   9
The strategic importance of foreign currency depends on its role in the national economy in terms of 
the level and structure of a country’s production, its participation in the external sector and the 
stability of internal prices. Exchange rate policies therefore play a key role within the framework of 
economic policy. 
The main objective of the neoliberal strategy is the control of inflation. Foreign balance is expected 
to be achieved by applying the monetary approach to the balance of payments
20. The economic 
policy design therefore contains the tools needed to promote monetary restrictions and to avoid 
excessive demand, which is in turn the cause of the excess of money, fueled by the high level of 
public expenditure and salary increases at the expense of productivity. 
The design of foreign trade policy is characterised by free trade, so that the prices of exportable 
products – international prices – are those determined by the fixed national prices and the resources 
are assigned on the basis of the market’s competitive advantages. Free exchange led to a relevant 
decrease of the customs tariffs, that had been established because of the previous import-
substituting policies. 
It is worth remembering that in Latin America, shortly after the crisis of the ‘30s,  State control over 
the financial system was considered a necessary measure to promote development. The fact that 
control over the capital market was entrusted to the State and not to the market, is one of the reasons 
that prompted criticism on the previous model from neoliberal supporters. 
Thus, in order to obtain the trust of the international financial sources and to create an attractive and 
safe image for private investment, the neoliberal strategy establishes the need for an economy open 
to the capital market and foreign investment. 
Financial liberalisation boasts activities such as the cut in the limits to capital entry and exit, the 
liberalisation of the national interest rate (so that it could become the main tool to select the most 
profitable investment projects), and the extension of special terms for the creation of new banks, 




1.3  The results of the first neoliberal experiences 
 
In Latin America from the ‘50s until today, the priority granted to the growth-balance ratio  was one 
of the main causes of the changes that occurred in that area as a result of the different economic 
policy designs. In the period included between the ‘50s and ‘70s economic growth and structural 
                                                 
20 Sufrimos de ideología de mercado, interview to Kenneth Galbraith, in “Página/12”, 22 August 1990, pp. 10-17 
21 Redondo Toronjo D., Sistema Productivo. De la edad de oro a la paradoja de los años noventa, in: Bañez P. and 
Manuela A (editors), Económia Mundial: Transito hacia el nuevo milenio, Piramide, Madrid, 1998, pp. 139-170    10
strategies were privileged. Starting from the ‘80s the balance became the main objective, mostly 
because of the criteria imposed by the International Monetary Fund and by the World Bank, 
according to which the economies had to be balanced prior to any growth process
22. 
The International Monetary Fund initially pursued simple stabilisation and then the reorientation of 
the national policies in terms of the productive structure of the economies of the area, within the 
framework of the so-called “structural adjustment policy”. 
A debate was started during the ‘80s concerning the need to apply macroeconomic adjustment 
policies. It highlighted fundamental differences on this point.  
The debate, however, shed light on essential topics such as the need to decrease important 
marcoeconomic imbalances
23 and on the negative effect of hyperinflation on economic growth. 
Consensus was reached concerning the need to establish a pre-emptive order among the policies 
aimed at adjustment and stabilisation; defining economic policies apt to abolish structural 
deficiencies and to subsequently deal with stabilisation
24. 
Finally, these economic policy designs (those with a clear “monetary fund” inspiration and the most 
“heterodox” ones) aimed at obtaining transformations in the economic-productive structure of the 
countries of this area. 
On the other hand, the debt crisis fuelled the structural crisis that had started to emerge in the 
previous years. In the ‘70s easy access to foreign credit led to overestimate the capacity of 
absorbing expenses, jeopardising the possibility of future growth as the region’s economy was 
becoming more and more financially dependent. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that with the 1982 debt crisis, caused by the abrupt interruption of 
capital flow towards Latin America, the countries of that area adopted “adjustment” policies. 
The countries were compelled to fulfil the obligations they had taken
25.  
Achieving positive results in foreign trade to pay off debt interests became the main objective of 
political design and a strong argument to affirm that the policies had to lead to structural changes 
suitable to guarantee foreign competitivity. 
During the period under consideration, all the Latin American countries implemented strict internal 
and external adjustments. A relevant percentage of the trade balance surplus, most of which had 
been obtained through strong import restrictions rather than through the actual increase of foreign 
                                                 
22 On this topic:  O’ Connor J., Crisis de acumulación, Penisula, Barcelona, 1987 
23 Fernández Tabales A., Neoliberalismo y territorio. Posibilidades de una nueva política regional en América Latina, 
Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, Sevilla, 1999, p. 71 
24 Katz J., Reformas estructurales, productividad y conducta tecnológica en América Latina, Fondo de cultura 
económica and CEPAL, Santiago del Chile, 2000, pp. 41-46 
25 Coraggio J.L., Territorio en transición. Crítica a la planificación regional en América Latina, cit., pp. 166-167   11
competitivity – evidence of this is the negative trend of relations in terms of exchange – was 
devoted to paying off debt interests.  
Deep fiscal adjustments were applied, most of which were caused by the soaring debt. Priority was 
given to the payment of debt interests, and the percentage of the total expenditure reserved to 
covering primary expenses was substantially reduced, especially in the 1981-1984 period. This 
reduction was mainly influenced by the cuts in public workers’ salaries and by the rise of 
unemployment in this sector
26.  
The policies aimed at curbing demand, that had been developed to stabilise the prices system did 
not produce the hoped-for results, even though they had been in force for a number of years. 
Variations in the consumer price index highlights a constant trend towards inflation growth. The 
recession induced by the stabilisation programs, as a tool to slow down inflation, was unable to curb 
hyperinflation in the ‘80s. 
 
 
2. Latin America in the ‘80s 
 
The adjustment programs enforced in this area as of 1983 enhanced the control of the following 
indicators: level of international reserves, internal inflation, internal growth level and fiscal deficit. 
The so-called increase of international competitivity involved the application of a restrictive 
monetary policy to keep internal inflation under control and to obtain the devaluation of the national 
currency. Another objective of this process was to eliminate inflationary pressure due to costs 
inflation. The “social” cost of this operation, however, was borne by the low-income groups. The 
devaluation of the national currency, accompanied by strong salary control, reduced the real salary 
of the workers.  
Moreover, public expenditure trimming caused the abolition of state subsidies for basic services and 
indispensable consumer goods, as well as the fall in public investment, the consequent rise of 
unemployment and of the informal labour market.  
Unemployment grew proportionally with the decline of economic activity. Its uncontrolled growth 
was partially avoided at the expense of employment quality, especially in the urban areas, by the 
rise of employment in the small and medium-sized enterprises – probably encouraged by the cut in 
real salaries – and by the surge of self-employed workers. In other words, there was a rapid growth 
of the informal labour market: there was a relative increase in the number of jobs in the sectors 
presenting the most unstable income levels. 
                                                 
26 Bulmer-Thomas V., La historia económica de América Latina desde la indipendencia, Fondo de cultura económica, 
México D.F., 1998, p. 455   12
During the 1983–1990 period, the GNP growth rate kept on decreasing (with the exception of the 
years 1986 and 1987). 
This decreasing tendency was also observed in the GNP growth rate per capita from 1.3% in 1984 
to -1,6% in 1990 of the regional average. 
There was a substantial increase of the growth rate of consumer prices, and the gross global foreign 
debt grew from 373,400 million dollars in 1984 to 439,100 million dollars in 1990
27. 
The Latin American population grew by approximately 2% and it reached approximately 433 
millions in 1991, while the percentage of the poor was nearly 41%, for a total of 183 million Latin 
Americans. 
These indicators worsened in the informal sector of the small and medium-sized firms, evidence of 
the deterioration of employment quality in Latin America. The 1986-1989 period was different, as 
the annual mean incomes per labour sector were the most affected compared to the severity of the 
economic crisis (1980–1983), with the greatest impact on the small enterprises, the informal sector 
and minimum salaries. 
The analysis of the urban employment structure in Latin America in the 1983–1989 period shows 
that the rise in unemployment was accompanied by the increase of the informal sector: the latter 
representing the “adjustment” variable of unemployment. 
 
 
2.1 Between the ‘80s and ‘90s 
 
The stabilisation efforts implemented in the ‘80s were hindered by the economic policy’s inability 
to preserve the basic macroeconomic balance. The destabilising shocks caused by fiscal imbalances 
were thus the main sources of instability observed in most Latin American countries.  
There are at least three sources of external shocks to which an economic activity can react,   
provided it has the capacity to do so. The first is the increase of export prices followed by the 
changes in the international interest rate and, finally, the sharp fluctuations of capital flows, the 
main cause of economic instability in Latin America during the ‘70s.   
From this point of view, the regional situation was the opposite of what it was in the ‘90s: nearly all 
the countries succeeded in closing the tax deficit, at least until 1994.  This difference can be 
explained by the changed international financial conditions and their effect on the evolution of the 
external sector. While Latin American countries experienced capital flights, interest rates dropped 
                                                 
27 Grassi E., Políticas y problemas sociales en la sociedad neoliberal. La otra década infame, cit., p. 47   13
in the early ‘90s. Access to voluntary financing was once more available and there was a constant 
flow of funds from abroad. 
As exports and foreign trade restrictions were reduced, the regional macroeconomic performance 
improved, since most of the patterns that had enhanced instability in the ‘80s were neutralised. First 
of all, foreign funds allowed to expand domestic absorption. On the other hand, the return of capital 
flows was so high that many countries had an excess of foreign currency due to the rapid growth of 
the deficits of ongoing transactions with the rest of the world. There was a generalised trend 
towards the accumulation of reserves and the appreciation of exchange rates
28. 
While in the ‘80s the exchange devaluations had opened the doors to rising inflation, in the ‘90s the 
drop in inflation was achieved with the support of exchange rate appreciations in most countries 
between 1990 and 1994 and once again between 1995 and 1997
29. 
Some countries faced traumatic failures in their fight against inflation (like Mexico) or recessions 
(like Mexico and Argentina in 1995). 
The surge in activities and the revaluation of the exchange rate had a beneficial effect on stability. 
Revaluation gave a significant contribution to the fall of the inflation rate, it improved the fiscal 
balance and reduced the real value of the interests on foreign debt. At the same time internal 
revenues soared as the activities and sales increased. The lower inflation rates contributed to boost 
the revenues by increasing the real value of the taxes to be paid. They also simplified the 
application of more effective tax and administrative reforms compared to the past
30. Moreover, in 
some countries, the tax balance was facilitated by the privatisations which were partially financed 
by the inflow of foreign capital. 
Among the changes in the international financial scenario that occurred in the ‘80s and early ‘90s, 
greater emphasis is placed on the flows of capital and on the evolution of the external sector. This 
does not mean, however, that some structural reforms did not have relevant positive effects. The 
efforts made to improve the efficiency of public expenditure and tax policies should not be 
underestimated. It is evident, however, that many reforms could not have been developed and many 
efforts to achieve greater efficiency could not have been made in an environment similar to that of 
the ‘80s, with credit rationing and the obligation to pay off debts to the rest of the world. 
 
2.2 Latin America in the ‘90s 
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The regional situation described above had one important exception, i.e. Brazil, at least until mid 
1994. The Plan Real
31, a stabilisation plan launched in July of that year, however, put Brazil’s 
economy on the same level as those of the other major countries of the area, in terms of both 
inflation and trade. In spite of this, a few months after Brazil’s macroeconomy had lined up with 
that of its neighbours, the economies of Mexico and Argentina once again started to show signs of 
instability and the need for a new external “adjustment”. 
Mexico was the leader of the regional process of stabilisation and structural reforms. It also played 
a key role in building up the expectations of the international investors on Latin America as a 
whole. Its growth process in the ‘90s was considered a stable model of development, with rising 
international, commercial and financial integration, in particular for the United States. In the early 
‘90s Mexico was perceived as an exemplary case in the subcontinent, and everybody hoped that the 
other countries would follow suit. Mexico therefore attracted capital flows to Latin America. The 
crisis of the exemplary case, however, showed that the ongoing modernisation processes were not 
immune to the return of instability
32.  This crisis, moreover, extinguished the sweeping effect that 
had characterised the regional boom in the early ‘90s.  
In this sense, the Mexican crisis is a milestone that marks the end of an extremely favourable period 
for economic growth, that had started in 1990, when Mexico signed the first Brady Plan
33 for 
restructuring foreign debt. 
The substantial multilateral financial help to Mexico and Argentina in 1995 allowed to avoid 
discontinuity in the trend of payments abroad and a scenario similar to the one of end 1982. This 
time the financial market remained open for the countries of Latin America, unlike what had 
happened in the previous crisis.  
Between 1991 and 1993, the net flows of financial resources to the region amounted to 
approximately 166,000 million dollars, while the current account deficits were 98,000 millions. The 
net flow of capitals, however, exceeded the current account deficit, and caused the accumulation of 
reserves. Of the afore-mentioned total regional net inflow, 75,000 millions belonged to Mexico, 
29,300 millions to Argentina, 19,500 millions to Brazil and 7,700 millions to Chile. These four 
countries concentrated 80% of the regional inflow between 1991 and 1993, Mexico alone 
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concentrating approximately 45% of the inflow
34. Apart from the countries considered, there was a 
significant inflow of funds even in Peru and Venezuela. The greatest inflow of capitals in this area 
was in 1993 with 70,000 million dollars, 29,500 of which went to Mexico and 14,800 to Argentina. 
During the ‘90s the revaluation of the exchange rate became a generalised phenomenon that each 
country handled in a different way. In Mexico (one of the countries together with Argentina that 
experienced the highest appreciation), the stabilisation program was applied in 1987 and the first 
significant results were observed in 1988, during the early stage of the program. Stabilisation 
continued at a slower pace until 1990 and picked up speed in 1991. In Argentina the exchange rate, 
fixed in 1991, had recorded an important real appreciation in 1990. On the other hand, during the 
same period, Chile and Colombia had relatively depreciated exchange rates and in 1994 they were 
positioned on the opposite side compared to Mexico and Argentina. Chile revalued less than the rest 
of the subcontinent, while this process accelerated in Colombia in 1994. There was an important 
appreciation in Brazil in 1990, as a result of the Plan Collor
35 stabilisation attempt. After its failure, 
the real exchange rate was continuously depreciated until 1993. Then, in the second semester of 
1994, during the first months of the Plan Real, the exchange rate was revalued by approximately 
30% in real terms. 
The different evolution of the real exchange rates is associated with the different macroeconomic 
policies experimented in the ‘90s. On the one hand, Mexico and Argentina applied stabilisation 
policies characterised by a fixed nominal exchange rate and by a more or less passive attitude faced 
with the consistent capital inflows. On the other hand, the monetary and fiscal exchange rate 
policies of Colombia, Chile and Brazil aimed at defending the real exchange rate (Brazil only until 
mid 1994)
36. 
The trade deficit kept on growing and achieved 15,300 million dollars in 1993. The overall Latin 
American figures, however, covered a range of very different national policies. Between 1991 and 
1993 trade surplus in Brazil achieved 39,800 million dollars and 11,300 million in 1994 following 
an increase in the imports. 
On the other side of the area, between 1991 and 1993 Medico accumulated a trade deficit of 63,200 
million dollars and something similar occurred in Argentina. In both cases the deficit’s trajectory 
was essentially determined by the rapid growth of imports. This trend continued in 1994, when the 
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overall deficit of those two countries achieved approximately 29,000 million dollars. In Chile the 
trade balance was positive with the exception of 1993. In Colombia, the imports increased rapidly 
and the trade balance passed from a surplus of 2,300 million dollars in 1991 to a deficit of 2,100 
millions in 1994
37.  
In the '90s there was a generalised decline in the exports growth rate – Brazil was the main 
exception until 1994 – and a strong imports increase. The annual growth rate of imports passed 
from 10.3%, in the second  half of the '80s, to 16.1% in the '90s, while the average variation rate of 
exports remained unchanged. These regional figures, however, are significantly affected by Brazil’s 
commercial performance and by the increase of its exports in the ‘90s. In Mexico, where the 
exchange rate was revalued at an earlier date, the rate of imports increase was three times higher 
than the exports in the second half of the '80s and this ratio continued in the years that followed. In 
Argentina the imports grew by 5.5% per year between 1991 and 1994, while the exports increased 
annually by 55.6%
38. 
In 1994 in Latin America there was a generalised improvement, in terms of exchange, with the 
exception of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. The increase was 2.7% for the region, but much 
greater in Colombia and Chile where it achieved 12.7 and 7.9%, respectively. In these two 
countries, the value of the exports thus increased considerably (20.1 and 25%, respectively) while 
the imports trends were similar to those in 1994, and grew by 22% in Colombia and by 7% in Chile. 
On the other side of this area, Mexico and Argentina experienced an additional decline of their trade 
balance in 1994, achieving record imbalances in both cases. This happened in spite of the more 
dynamic role of exports in that year that increased by 18.2% in Mexico and by 25% in Argentina. 
The afore-described performance of foreign trade affected the evolution of the indicators that 
allowed to characterise the degree of external fragility of the economies considered. The overall 
ratio of the current account/exports deficit in Latin America was 27.5% in 1993 and slighltly lower 
in 1994. This average regional indicator is affected by the favourable results of the external 
Brazilian sector, whose current account was practically balanced. In consideration of the above, the 
average regional fragility indicator can be used as a standard term of comparison of the national 
cases. 
It is worth describing the situation in 1993, because it preceded the 1994 change in capital flow 
trends described further on. In 1993 the countries’ external fragility indicators were ordered on the 
basis of a clear model. On the one hand, the quotients of Chile and Colombia were lower than the 
                                                 
37 Bulmer-Thomas V., La historia económica de América Latina desde la indipendencia, cit., p. 462 
38 Kosacoff B. e Ramos A., Reformas de los noventa: estrategías empresariales y el debate sobre crecimineto 
económico, Boletin Informativo Technit, n. 310, 2003, p. 67-68 
   17
regional average. On the other hand, in Mexico and in Argentina, the external fragility indicators 
doubled the Latin American average. The foreign debt/exports ratio shows a similar distribution, 
although Brazil’s heavy indebtedness is similar to that of Mexico and Argentina. In 1994, the 
current account/exports deficit ratio slightly increased in Colombia – even though it remained lower 
than the regional average– and decreased in Chile. The current account/exports deficit ratio 





2.3 The causes, repercussions and consequences of the Mexican crisis 
 
In 1993 the external fragility data of the economies of Mexico and Argentina were the worst of the 
region. Within this scenario one would expect that keeping up the macroeconomic performance 
indicators of the early ‘90s would be a difficult task. In 1994, a long time before the Mexican 
devaluation of December, new elements emerged and became the initial symptoms of decline. One 
of these was the change in the trend of international reserves in Argentina and in Mexico. In 
particular, a perceptible fall of the reserves was observed in Mexico. This change started in 
February 1994, when the Federal Reserve increased its discount rates. 
Dating from this decision of the FED, and against conventional forecasts, the prices of long-term 
bonds dropped and their rates increased at the same pace as those of the short-term bonds. 
Moreover, both movements had a more than proportional impact on the prices of Latin American 
bonds
40. There was a concomitant, generalised increase of the country risk index, especially in 
Mexico and in Argentina. This event has to be emphasised because it is evidence of the negative 
general attitude of the international markets towards Latin America in the ‘90s. The increase of the 
country risk index did not reflect the overall situation of the region, but is related to the external 
financial fragility levels of the different countries: it increased less in Chile and Colombia, and more 
in Mexico and Argentina. The trend of prices of Latin American bonds in the secondary market is 
symptomatic: prices plummeted in Mexico and Argentina in early 1994, they declined slightly in 
Brazil, and remained stable in Chile
41. 
We must ask ourselves what circumstances can explain the afore-mentioned parallel increase of the 
country risk index and the interest rates in the US. A plausible explanation is that the international 
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investors had perceived an increase in the external financial fragility as a result of the higher rates 
the debtors had to pay. In spite of this, when they requested greater guarantees for the risk, the 
attitude of the financial markets underlined the unfavourable impact. Thus, while Mexico’s crisis 
should have induced a coordinated “mass” reaction towards year end, the change in the Federal 
Reserve’s rate discount policy produced this coordinated effect at an earlier date. The crisis in 
Mexico thus represented a particular event at the end of a period of growing financial tension that 
had started at the beginning of the year. This crisis had a significant impact on the rest of the region. 
This sequence of events was a deja vu. It resembled the events observed at the end of the ‘70s and 
in the early ‘80s. In general terms, it can be summed up as a financial boom followed by a period of 
tension in the financial markets and finally by an unexpected contraction. 
The change in the capital inflow pattern observed in 1994 in Mexico and Argentina was a 
generalised trend at the regional level. In that year the total capital inflow in Latin America was 
47,000 million dollars compared to an annual average of approximately 55,000 millions between 
1991 and 1993 and a maximum of 70,000 millions in 1993. This change is obvious for the two 
afore-mentioned countries, especially for Mexico, whose annual net inflow dropped to 10,500 
millions. In 1994 capital inflows increased in Brazil and in Colombia, and they were comparable  to 
those of the previous year in the rest of the region
42. 
The plunge in capital inflow in Mexico and Argentina occurred in both cases when the current 
account deficit continued to increase. In 1993 the deficits amounted to 23,500 millions in Mexico 
and 7,500 millions in Argentina, and rose up to 30,600 millions and 11,100  millions, respectively, 
in 1994. The fall in capital inflow added to the higher current account deficit led to a contraction of 
the reserves of Mexico and Argentina in 1994, for the first time in the ‘90s. Mexico’s reserves 
amounted to 29,000 million dollars in February 1994 when the US monetary policy started 
increasing the interest rate. The reserves dropped to 6,000 millions on 22 December when the 
Mexican authorities decided to fluctuate the exchange rate, devaluing the peso by an initial 15%. 
The declines in capital flows – and the above-mentioned increase of the country risk index – 
occurred in the countries with the most unfavourable external fragility indexes and when the interest 
rate in the US started to increase. These were the same countries that had received the greatest 
amount of capital until 1993. 
In 1995 the Latin American countries reacted to the new conditions of international financing in 
different ways according to their different external situations. For a while, the initial turbulence 
generated by Mexico’s devaluation hit all Latin America, even the farthest emerging markets. Once 
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this relatively short crisis was over, the economies of Chile and Colombia did not experience 
additional jolts.  
Brazil’s economy had overcome the high inflation process that had distinguished it from the rest of 
the countries analysed in this paper, and it enjoyed a period of greater stability starting from the 
implementation of the Plan Real in July 1994. The immediate outcome of the stabilisation plan on 
the balance of payments, however, was the fragility of the economy’s external situation.  In the first 
semester of 1995 the first capital flights were observed. In spite of all this, when this period was 
over, Brazil managed, with some difficulties, to control its inflation and to finance its huge current 
account deficit. In 1995 Brazil absorbed enormous foreign capital inflows, and its situation became 
similar to Mexico’s up to 1993
43. 
On the contrary, in 1995 the economies of Mexico and Argentina suffered once again the 
destabilising consequences of external adjustments. Both countries lost private capital throughout 
the year, compensated by a strong increase of foreign debt. Inflation picked up pace in Mexico and 
both economies were hit by recession. In 1995 there was a 6.6% drop of the GNP in Mexico, and of 
4.6% in Argentina. The recession triggered by external adjustments highlighted the discontinuity of 
the growth process, as well as a change in the pattern of the process. Employment conditions 
became increasingly worse. In Argentina, investments dropped by 16% in 1995 and in Mexico by 




2.4 Macroeconomic policies and structural reforms: effects on growth, competitivity and 
employment 
 
There were important differences in the long-term growth patterns observed in the various countries 
of Latin America. As previously described, growth restrictions, external ones in particular, which 
were prevalent in the ‘90s, were gradually reduced in most of the area. However, growth did not 
evolve in the same way in all the countries. The domestic market expanded, but the countries had 
different consumption and investment policies. The domestic savings rate stabilised in some 
countries and decreased in others. In some countries investments focused on non commercial 
activities. The economic policies of that period – the specific national combinations of stabilising 
                                                 
43 Mirando J.C., Reestructuración industrial en un contexto de instabilidad macroeconómica. El caso de Brasil, in : 
Katz J., Estabilización macroeconómica, reforma estructural y comportamiento industrial; estructura y funcionamiento 
del sector manifacturero latinoamericano en lo años 90, Alianza Editoria, Buneos Aires, 1996, p. 31-34 
44 Cuello R., La decada de los noventa: profundación en el marco de una recesión estructural, cit., pp. 103-105   20
reform policies, applied to the new context, were an important explanation of these differences. It is 
worth underlining some of the different effects on competitiveness and employment. 
Another important change of the ‘90s, besides the above-described transformation of the 
international situation, was the extension of the structural reforms. In general, this process followed 
the recommendations of the so-called “Washington Consensus”, fostering the growing deregulation 
of the markets and trimming the role of the public sector in the economy.  
Ambitious trade liberalisation plans were applied in nearly all the countries of the area. Capital 
flows were liberalised and the domestic financial markets deregulated. Privatisations were carried 
out especially in Chile, Argentina and Messico. 
Although the Washington Consensus program is well defined, the key aspects of the reform were 
handled ambiguously in terms of their practical application, or simply ignored. The first issue is the 
sequence of the reforms. In general, the program disregards the complex transition process, but is 
firm on two points: the first step of the sequence is stabilisation and the last is the liberalisation of 
capital movements, which should never occur before or at the same time as the liberalisation of 
foreign trade. The second point is the possibility that the reforms in themselves, or the integration of 
a number of reforms, may produce unexpected macroeconomic events or adversely affect pre-
existing imbalances. It implicitly states that when stability is attained, the subsequent reforms will 
not damage it in any case
45. 
The sequence of policies has been frequently determined by short-term economic and political 
needs, rather than by an analysis based on the lessons learnt. It is worth observing that foreign trade 
was liberalised when the capital account and the domestic financial market were liberalised. As 
mentioned above, the sudden increase of capital investment led to the appreciation of the exchange 
rate. The trade liberalisation of the ‘90s occurred when the exchange rate was appreciated, like the 
liberalisation experiences of the Cono Sur area at the end of the ‘70s. The surge in the trade deficit 
is one of the visible consequences of this process. In addition to the afore-described sustainability 
problems, this situation had other consequences on the savings trend, on investments, on the way 
investments are assigned and on the efficiency with which resources are handled. 
First of all, the joint effects of trade liberalisation, the cut in customs tariffs and the increase of 
liquidity and credit induced a strong rise of intermediate and consumer goods imports. A decline in 
in the savings rate of families, which was obvious in all the countries considered with the exception 
of Chile, was also observed.  
Secondly, the revalued exchange rate, added to the effects of the trade liberalisation, made some 
domestic activities competitive on an international level (this is possible with a long-term exchange 
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rate). The effect on the export activities and the effect of cheap imports on the local production of 
tradable  goods at the international level contributed to curbing the growth rate, increasing 
unemployment and adversely affecting the regional and sectoral income distribution. The damage 
inflicted upon the firms and physical and human capital having reached irreversible levels, these 
effects persist. The process of “deindustrialisation” and “substitution” of manufactured imports 
involves the broad adaptation of the economic structure to a transitory model of relative prices and 
capital flows. The longer the duration of the appreciated exchange rate, the greater the effects of 
dislocation/displacement on the structure of the economy. Among the countries considered, Mexico 
and Argentina are the most obvious examples of the effects of dislocation and its consequences. In 
Mexico poor growth results were evident . In Argentina these effects were evident until 1993 
together with a strong “boom” of aggregate demand induced by capital entries. In this case, the 
most obvious expression of these effects is the increase of unemployment. In the period of rapid 
expansion, between 1991 and mid 1994, the unemployment rate increased from 6.5% to 12%. In 
1995, with ongoing recession, the urban unemployment rate achieved 18.6%
46. 
Third, during the exchange rate revaluation period the relative prices had additional long-lasting  
effects on the structure of the economy, because they provided misleading information for the 
assignment of  investments in commercial and non commercial activities.  
Fourth, while the expansion of the (deregulated and open) financial system was encouraged to 
attract capital entry, it was not aimed at solving the traditional problem of poor long-term financing, 
and it thus caused new problems. Although inflation decreased, the attitude towards short-term 
deposits and credits persisted. A substantial part of the new credit was directed to finance 
consumption, constructions and real estate investments. This determined the appearance of a 
systemic risk associated with the evolution of exchange rate parity, in that most of the credit was 
directed to non commercial activities. Also, in many cases the increase of financial indicators was 
concomitant with the decrease in the savings rate. The segmentation of the credit market continued 
to be a typical characteristic of the financial systems. In general, the credit for small and medium-
sized firms was expensive and scarce. In the ‘90s, in Mexico and in Argentina, as in other smaller 
economies such as Bolivia and Peru, the stylised characteristics of the evolution of the financial 
systems, are similar to those observed in the Cono Sur area at the end of the ‘70s. In some cases 
these was a firm tendency to the dollarisation of the financial system
47. 
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2.5 Latin America during the neoliberal governments: Mexico and Argentina as emblematic 
cases in the region 
  
The stabilisation programs implemented in Mexico and Argentina, accompanied by the 
liberalisation of trade and the appreciation of the real exchange rate, were the macroeconomic 
scenario within which the economies of both countries grew during the early ‘90s (up to 1994) and, 
in the case of Argentina, throughout that decade. As in other trade liberalisation experiences with 
real exchange rate appreciation, the tradable goods sectors adapted to the shock by boosting labour 
productivity
48. The result of this acceleration was the delay in growth, or the contraction of 
employment in the tradable goods sectors. From 1990 to 1994 the employment rate in the 
manufacturing sector declined in both countries, although to a greater extent in Argentina. In 
Mexico the decrease was not significant. After the 1995 recession, that had been associated with the 
1994 crisis of the balance of payments in Mexico and with its “tequila effect” on Argentina, the 
employment rate started increasing in Mexico. This did not happen in Argentina, where in 2001 the 
employment rate was only two thirds of the level it boasted in 1990. 
The trend of the real salaries and GNP growth rate throughout that decade are considerably similar 
in both economies (with an annual GNP growth rate of approximately 1.3% between 1990-2001). 
Moreover, from 1990 to 1994, the 1.1% (6.4% between 1990 and 1995) drop in the industrial 
employment rate in Mexico is comparable with the 11% rate in Argentina (16.3% for the years 
1990–1995). So, in the first part of this decade (1990–1994), GNP growth was more rapid in 
Argentina (7.6% versus 3.6% per year in Mexico), while in the second part of the decade, following 
the 1995 recession, employment grew at a faster rate in Mexico, where even the GNP increased 
more than in Argentina. As a matter of fact, from 1996 to 2001, employment in Argentina 
continued to decrease at an annual rate of  –4.7%, while it rose in Mexico at an annual rate of 5.7% 
(1996–2000). In this period, Mexico achieved a GNP growth rate of 4.3% from 1996 to 2001 
(compared to 0.6% in Argentina).  
One of the factors that contributes to explain the different pattern of employment growth in Mexico 
and Argentina is the expansion of the US economy in the ‘90s, especially during the second half of 
this decade. Starting from the second half of the ‘80s and in particular with the enforcement of the 
NAFTA agreement in 1994, the Mexican trade cycle was increasingly synchronised with that of the 
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US economy: demand strongly contributed to employment expansion in the Mexican maquila 
sector
49.  
In Latin America, Argentina and Mexico represent two different models of trade specialisation. An 
important part of Mexican exports is increasingly oriented towards manufactured products (the 
maquiladoras and non maquiladoras representing approximately 80% of the total exports in 2000), 
while those in Argentina are dominated by natural resources, primary and agricultural products, 
amounting to approximately 70% during the '90s. These differences in the trade models had 
important effects on the evolution of employment in the tradable goods sectors. 
It is important to analyse the evolution of employment and labour productivity in two of Mexico’s 
manufacturing sectors: the export maquiladora industry – which includes a large part of the 
manufacturing sector producing exportable goods – and the non maquiladora industry, mainly 
grouping the importable goods activities. During the overvaluation period that accompanied trade 
liberalisation, the employment level in the non maquiladora industry declined (7.4%, compared to 
the 11% drop in all the Argentine manufacturing sector). The rise in employment in the 
maquiladoras  industry compensated the significant decline of employment in the manufacturing 
sector between 1990 and 1994, which partially explains the contrast with the Argentine experience. 
In general, there was an important restructuring of the Mexican manufacturing sector in that decade, 
with rapid employment growth in the maquiladoras industries, whose participation in that sector’s 
employment grew from 14% to 30% between 1990 and 2000. This growth continued at a rapid pace 
after the devaluation at the end of 1994. It contributed to increasing the employment levels per unit 
of production in the manufacturing sector.  
Labour productivity in the maquiladoras industry did not grow rapidly after the trade reform. This 
is no surprise: the maquiladoras were established under a free trade regime. They did not have to 
adapt to the new conditions created by trade liberalisation. 
The Argentine experience does not diverge from the Mexican non maquiladora manufacturing 
sector during the first half of the '90s, although employment contraction was significantly more 
important than in Mexico. The key difference is that no manufacturing subsector in Argentina 
played a shock-absorber role similar to that of the Mexican maquiladoras
50.  
The Argentine manufacturing sector experienced profound restructuring in the ‘90s. From 1991 
onwards, this sector’s employment rate continued to decrease, while production per worker and per 
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working hour continued to rise. Employment in the manufacturing sector dropped by 37% during 
the 1990–2001 period
51. 
The different patterns followed by the manufacturing industries are mainly due to the competitivity 
conditions prevailing at the end of the ‘80s. Faced with lower customs tariffs, an appreciated 
exchange rate and a strong increase of internal demand, the industries with the most competitive 
exports were those whose relative competitivity was already high before the shocks, i.e. the natural 
resources processing industries and the industrial commodities. As in Mexico, the forces that 
operated during the first part of the ‘90s were affected by the strengthening and consolidation of the 
relative competitivity conditions present at the end of the ‘80s. As previously mentioned, however, 
in Argentina no manufacturing subsector played the role of the maquiladora industry in Mexico,  
absorbing part of the labour force shift that followed the imports increase and labour decrease per 
production unit in the rest of the manufacturing sector. The entire manufacturing sector had 
trimmed the labour force. The generalised cut in the labour per production unit was mainly induced 
by the introduction of technologies and organisational changes aimed at saving labour. It also 
included changes in the production profile (e.g. a basket of less diversified goods). 
Effects similar to trade opening on the average productivity and employment can be observed on a 
smaller scale in Brazil, where the opening process started in 1990. In the ‘90s, the industrial product 
fluctuated following the aggregate demand cycle, while employment in the manufacturing sector 
tended to systematically decrease. In Brazil the situation started to improve in mid 1992, and was 
reflected in the 19% growth of the industrial product in two years and in unemployment decrease. 
Thus, in Mexico and in Argentina, and to a smaller extent in Brazil, trade opening seemed 
associated with the increase of the average productivity per employed worker and with a decline in 
the unemployment rate. On the contrary, the model observed in Chile in the ‘90s is completely 
different. In this country trade opening dates back to the ‘70s. Starting from the second half of the 
‘80s the growth of the industry led to the expansion of the textile and engineering industries, a 
process that some authors have labelled a “new phase of import-substitution”
52. In 1993 
manufactured products had increased much more than in Mexico and Argentina, i.e. 37% higher 
than the average of the second half of the ‘80s. Moreover, unlike Mexico and Argentina, the 
manufacturing sector created new employment opportunities: in 1993 manufacturing employment 
was 28% higher than the average of the second half of the ‘80s. The average productivity per 
employed person increased by 7% in that period. 
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3. The decline of the neoliberal experience 
 
The reforms of the '90s are usually considered painful but unavoidable initiatives for the definite 
start of Latin American growth; this path towards growth had been abandoned by Latin American 
countries when they had adhered to the “import-substitution” model. Based on the annual GNP 
growth rate, the results were not the ones expected. The area grew by 4.9% per year in the ‘50s, it 
rose to 5.5% in the following decade and it continued growing by 5.1% in the 1973-1980 period
53. 
The “lost decade” of the ‘80s, that opened the doors to the debt crisis, meant a meagre 1.6% growth 
rate for Latin America. 
The macroeconomy of Latin American countries was significantly affected by the changes in 
capital flows over the last three decades. There was a huge offer of funds in the ‘70s, followed by 
funds scarcity in the ‘80s (when it became an exporting region). Between 1991 and 1994 it was 
once again the recipient of substantial amounts of funds and later suffered a sharp decrease in some 
of the main flows between end 1994 and early 1995. Funds started flowing once again in 1996 and 
1997, but external financing reached an abrupt end in the 1998-99 period.  
The debt crisis of the ‘80s highlighted the structural shortcomings of some Latin American 
economies. It had severe effects, and the income per capita dropped by an average 0.7% per year 
between 1981 and 1989. The 1990-2004 period is associated with intense economic reforms 
implemented as a result of the “Washington Consensus”. Although the outcome was better than that 
of the ‘80s, with a 0.9% growth per capita, it remained unsatisfactory: in the 1950-80 period 
expansion was much lower than 2.6%, lower than worldwide growth (1.1%) and growth in the 
developed world (USA with 1.8%)
54. 
Severe and reiterated financial crises (in the ‘80s and ‘90s) and an unfavourable placement of Latin 
American economies in the international arena were two surprising consequences of the 
implemented policies. 
Systemic signs show that the emerging economies were unable to handle the abundance of capital 
to avoid monetary and financial crises. The consequences were severe in terms of growth and 
equity. A number of crises were caused by irresponsible or populist public deficit policies. 
Successful and apparently healthy emerging economies, however, have frequently suffered severe 
imbalances due to flows of volatile capital. At the height of foreign financing, the new resources 
flowed towards the share market and private consumption, generating price bubbles, overpricing the 
exchange rate and inducing a non sustainable growth of the aggregate demand. The consequences 
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were trade deficits and soaring indebtedness (especially in the private sector), that stemmed from 
capital entries. The inappropriate policies that led to this vulnerability were fostered by the 
international capital markets: an example is the enthusiastic abundance in Argentina until 1998 and 
in Mexico in the early ‘90s
55.   
It is also worth observing that the financing of the capital accumulation process in Latin America 
continued. It depended to a large extent on the trade surplus of the primary sector of the economy. 
In this sense, although the neoliberal model succeeded in recreating natural competitive advantages, 
no relevant integration in the value chains was observed, and the exports continued to focus on the 
generation of commodities. Prices fluctuation and the poor dynamics of these products – within the 
protectionist policies of the developed countries – represented a source of restrictions and, in the 
worst cases, of uncertainty in the financial economic outlook
56. 
A number of factors linked to these restrictions were enhanced by the financial opening 
implemented by the model. The capitals thus entered and exited the financial markets following a 
“procyclic” pattern, and the periods of growth were reinforced by short-term capital entry, while the 
recessions were aggravated by their flight. The foreign indebtedness of transnational firms, 
however, was not reduced. The situation was extremely critical: dealing with foreign debt became 
an increasingly complex matter. 
The combination of internal policies and external restrictions produced an unsustainable growth.  
The growth cycles were shorter and shorter, and they were followed each time by increasingly 
severe recessions. The combination of real and financial shocks led to “recessive adjustments” since 
the growth of exports and the expansion of the internal market could not take place at the same 
time
57. 
The failure of neoliberal policies is also explained by the fact that one of the pending problems, i.e. 
financial dependence, became increasingly worse: an area grows only when the funds it receives 
from abroad are greater than those it remits. 
Upheld as the synonym and symbol of modernity, neoliberalism had negative effects on the 
region’s processes of scientific and technological innovation. The resources invested in innovation 
and development were dangerously low. Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay invested slightly less 
than 1% of the GNP in the early 90s and this level remained unchanged until the end of the 
decade
58. 
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This approach had severe consequences when compared with that of other “emerging” countries 
(e.g. the South Eastern countries) where the funds destined to this purpose increased. The 
“technological” divide that separates Latin American countries from both the developed and 
developing countries of the region, consequently increased. 
Starting from the mid ’80s, Latin America experienced a significant exports increase, associated 
with the devaluation of the local currencies for the debt crisis and by an intense trade opening. Its 
exports soared and grew by over 7% between 1990 and 2004. In spite of the exports success, the 
global economic performance was unsatisfactory, with an average 2.6% GNP growth in the same 
period. Over these fifteen years, trade reforms adversely affected the import-substituting sectors and 
contributed to the costly external imbalances that caused the crisis. On the other hand, the intensity 
and quality of the exports policy and its bonds with the rest of the economy are very different from 
those observed in Asia. Latin America keeps a basket of exportable products that consists mainly of 
natural resources with poor aggregate value. After this unilateral liberalisation stage, the region 
started a new cycle of interregional integration development, characterised by the enforcement of 
free or preferential trade agreements. This so-called open regionalism strategy improved the 
opening process of Latin American countries, because it was a mutual exchange as opposed to a 
unilateral opening, and it expanded the markets. In turn, greater interregional integration stimulated 
a change in the basket of exportable products and encouraged the participation of non conventional 
exportable products, manufactured goods in particular.  
While tax restrictions and anti-industrial public policy distortions limited the State’s action in the 
field of innovation and development, there were no private investments in the areas “abandoned” by 
the State. It was not only a question of resources. The macroeconomic scenario was a strong 
incentive for the purchase of foreign items as sources of technical change to the detriment of 
endogenous efforts and development. 
The financial system based its credit decisions on the economic solvency of the applicant and not on 
the evaluation of the projects. The neglect of sectoral policies did not limit the competitive 
production processes, especially the foreign ones.  
Moreover, in accordance with Inter-American Development Bank statistics for the 1998-1999 
period, the wealthiest 5% of the population received 25% of the income, while the poorest 30% 
received only 7%
59, in a directly proportional relationship between growth and poverty. 
As far as the international role of Latin America is concerned, neoliberalism enhanced the export of 
primary goods. In the 1985-2000 period, while the exports of primary products worldwide grew by 
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an average annual rate of 3.7%, the rate of the manufactured products exports grew twice as much, 
i.e. by 9.1%. 
Taking a closer look at the process, while the manufactures based on natural resources grew by an 
annual rate of 6.6%, low and medium technology products rose by over 8% and high technology 
products by 13.2%. 
The different evolution of the various types of exports determined the contribution of each type of 
product to the total percentage of exported products. It is worth observing that the overall 
percentage of primary goods exported dropped from 23 to 12.4 % of the total, while the percentage 
of manufactured products increased; interestingly, the 10 percentage points gained represent high 
technology goods.  
Making matters even worse, Latin America dropped behind other less developed countries. The 
participation of Latin America in the trade of manufactures from developed countries decreased 
(excluding Mexico whose situation was described above for its special bond with the United 
States), while the manufactures from South East Asian countries increased. The percentage dropped 
from 17 to 9% of the total, impacting on the participation of medium, high-technology exports. At 
the end of the decade, the exports of goods incorporating medium technology coming from Latin 
America versus the total exports from developing countries dropped from 17.5 to 10%, while the 
exports of high technology products dropped from 6.6 to 2.1%
60. 
In essence, neoliberal policies enhanced the region’s role in the global market as a supplier of 
primary and manufactured goods based on natural resources and low technology. It is therefore a 
limited “primary specialisation” compared to the policies adopted by the developed countries, the 
“natural” recipients of the exported goods. 
One of the most severe consequences of the “Washington Consensus” was the poor investment rate 
level. Latin America needs long-term funding, access to technology and capacity to absorb it, 
trained human resources and infrastructures complementary to the investment in production. As 
discussed above, neoliberalism is based on the assumption that liberalisations and privatisations 
obviously increase the supply of these ingredients required for the potential product. This supply, 
however, does not often always appear spontaneously or at the appropriate time. Addressing this 
problem is one of the challenges of reforms and public policies. This is what we call completing 
factor markets. Incomplete or underdeveloped markets cannot function properly. Sometimes they 
do not even supply the items required for the aggregate production function. Incompleteness is an 
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intrinsic characteristic of underdevelopment, and denotes the lack of productive capacity or 
systemic competitivity
61. 
While the policies failed in their attempt – or lack of attempt – to integrate the value chains by 
incorporating aggregate value in the form of qualified labour and technology, the positive 
contribution of natural resources as a competitive advantage, did not help the development of Latin 
American countries.  
Among the structural reforms adopted within the globalisation framework, the setting up of 
subsidiaries of multinational enterprises of developed countries in underdeveloped countries is 
explained by the need to reduce costs and maximise capitals. The creation of the product, the 
research and development processes, as well as their innovation and management, are carried out by 
the  corporations at their headquarters located in the “first world”. The production process is 
transferred abroad to take advantage of the availability of raw materials, low labour cost or the 
proximity of the target consumers market
62. 
Within this scenario, the protection of foreign investments is necessary for the “new global order”. 
On the one hand these investments will have to be regulated by the same measures and policies as 
national investments (a principle knows as the “national treatment”), for which a discriminatory 
treatment is forbidden. It is also useful to remember that the protection of foreign investments is 
ensured by bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
In Latin America the process of neoliberal modernisation has apparently reached its conclusion.  
At the beginning of the new millenium, the political parties that had defended the principles of 
neoliberalism abandoned their position in order to maintain electoral support, while the research 
centres, the intellectuals and the communicators that had postulated neoliberal principles have lost 
the electorate’s support and no longer hold a leading position in the debate on these ideas.  
The governments that had committed themselves to neoliberal proposals were removed from power 
by elections, social upheavals or a combination of both. Two obvious examples are Mexico and 
Argentina. The international financial institutions announced a review of their policies and 
promised self criticism. 
As for the neoliberal reforms, the most relevant point is that the productive, financial, technological 
and social results shed light on the limits and lack of satisfactory responses of the neoliberal 
proposals faced with the great expectations and needs of Latin American countries. 
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Today the new “progressist” governments win over popular trust through the discontent of the 
people, by exposing the shortcomings of neoliberal policies and by promising a new social pact and 
greater attention for the needs of the people.  
However, although neoliberal policies did not fulfil their promise of substantially improving the 
social situation of the masses and of starting a new age of sustainable growth, they were successful 
in reshaping the organisation of Latin American production, increasing the exports of primary 
products and consolidating the new shape and structure of the State.  
At the economic and financial level, this inheritance is difficult to handle, while within the current 
political debate no clearly designed alternative project seems to emerge from the ashes of the 
neoliberal discourse.  
For the governments of today the challenge is to look ahead, past the calamitous state of Latin 
America and the rise in poverty, to discuss feasible alternatives independent of the old 




-BID, Desarrollo más allá de la económia. Progreso económico y social de América Latina, Inter-
American Development Bank, Washington D.C., 2000 
-Buitelaar R., Padilla R. e Urrutia R., Centroamérica México y República Dominicana: maquila y 
tranformación productiva, Cuadernos de la CEPAL, n. 85, CEPAL, Santiago del Chile, 2000 
-Bulmer-Thomas V., La historia económica de América Latina desde la indipendencia, Fondo de 
cultura económica, México D.F., 1998 
-Buscaglia A. E., La economía argentina a fines del siglo XX, in: Marcelo R. Lascano (a cura di), 
La economía argentina hoy, El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 2001 
-Bustos Ramírez J., Estructura juridica y estado en América Latina, in: Fundación Pablo Iglesias, 
Caminos de la democracia en América Latina, Pablo Iglesias, Madrid, 1984 
-Casares E. e Sobarzo H. (a cura di), Diez años del TLCAN en México. Una perspectiva analítica, 
Fondo de cultura económica, México D.F., 2004 
-Clavijo F. (a cura di), Reformas economícas en México, 1982-1999, Colleción Lecturas del 
Trimestre Economico 92, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México D.F., 2000 
-Coraggio J. L., Territorio en transición. Crítica a la planificación regional en América Latina, 
Ciudad, Centro de investigaciones, Quito, 1988 
-Cortes R. e Marshall A., Estrategia económica, instituciones y negociación politíca en la reforma 
social de los noventa, Desarrollo Económico, Instituto de desarrollo económico y social, vol. 39, n. 
154 (luglio-settembre 1999) 
-Cuello R., La decada de los noventa: profundación en el marco de una recesión estructural, 
in:Lascano M. R. (a cura di), La económia argentina de hoy, El Ateneo, Buenos Aires, 2001 
-Dos Santos T., Neoliberalismo: doctrina y política, in “Comercio exterior”, n. 117, gennaio-
febbraio 1999 
-Eggers-Brass T., Historia argentina (1806-2004). Una mirada crítica, Maipue, Ituzaingó (Buenos 
Aires), 2004 
-Fernández Tabales A., Neoliberalismo y territorio. Posibilidades de una nueva política regional en 
América Latina, Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, Sevilla, 1999 
-Ffrench-Davis R., Reformas para América Latina después del fundamentalismo neoliberal, Siglo 
XXI editores Argentina, 2005 
-Gerchunoff P. e Torre J. C., La politíca de liberalización económica en la administración Menem 
in: “Desarrollo económico”, vol. 36, n. 143, ottobre-dicembre 1996 
-Grassi E., Políticas y problemas sociales en la sociedad neoliberal. La otra década infame, 
Espacio Editorial, Buenos Aires, 2003 
-Katz J., Reformas estructurales, productividad y conducta tecnológica en América Latina, Fondo 
de cultura económica e CEPAL, Santiago del Chile, 2000 
-Kosacoff B. e Ramos A., Reformas de los noventa: estrategías empresariales y el debate sobre 
crecimineto económico, Boletin Informativo Technit, n. 310, 2003 
-Krauze E., La presidencia imperial. Ascenso y caída del sistema político mexicano (1940-1996), 
Tusquets, México D.F., 1997 
-Marcaida E. V. (a cura di), Estudios de historia económica y social. De la revolución industrial a 
la globalización neoliberal, Biblos, Buenos Aires, 2002 
-Mirando J.C., Reestructuración industrial en un contexto de instabilidad macroeconómica. El caso 
de Brasil, in  : Katz J., Estabilización macroeconómica, reforma estructural y comportamiento 
industrial; estructura y funcionamiento del sector manifacturero latinoamericano en lo años 90, 
Alianza Editoria, Buneos Aires, 1996 
-Mouguillansky G. e Bielchowsky R., Reformas económicas e inversion: América Latina en los 
años noventa, CEPAL e Fondo de Cultura Económica, Santiago del Chile, 2000   32
-O’ Connor J., Crisis de acumulación, Penisula, Barcellona, 1987 
-Orlansky D., El concepto de desarrollo y las reformas estatales: visiones de los noventa, in: Tercer 
congreso argentino de administración publica, Congreso argentino de administración publica, 2-4 
giugno 2005, San Migule de Tucúman 
-Prebisch R., El desarrollo económico de la América Latina y algunos de sus principales 
problemas, in: Cincuenta años de pensamiento en la CEPAL: textos seleccionados, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica Chile S.A., Santiago del Chile, 1998 
-Rapoport M. e collaboratori, Historia económica, política y social de la Argentina (1880-2000), 
Ariel, Buenos Aires, 2006 
-Redondo Toronjo D., Sistema Productivo. De la edad de oro a la paradoja de los años noventa, in: 
Bañez P. e Manuela A (a cura di), Económia Mundial: Transito hacia el nuevo milenio, Piramide, 
Madrid, 1998 
-Reinhardt N. e Peres W., Latin America’s new economic model: micro reponses and economic 
restructuring, in: “World Development”, vol. 28, n. 9 
-Rofman A., El Plan de Convertibilidad y su impacto regresivo sobre los mercados de trabajo 
regionales. Argentina 1991-1994, Seminario Internaconal sobre impactos territoriales de los 
procesos de reestructuración, Pontificia universidad catolica del Chile, Santiago del Chile, 1995 
-Sánchez M. A., Privatizaciones y extranjerización de la económia argentina, in  : “Realidad 
Económica”, n. 166 
-Sevares J., Por qué cayó la Argentina. Imposición, crisis y reciclaje del orden neoliberal, Grupo 
Norma, Buenos Aires, 2002 
-Sufrimos de ideología de mercado, intervista a Kenneth Galbraith, in “Página/12”, 22 agosto 1990 
Touraine A., Mutaciones de América Latina, in: “Revista Sociedad”, n. 2, Facultad de Ciencias 
Sociales (UBA), Buenos Aires, maggio 1993 
-Wolfe M., Enfoques del desarrollo: ¿de quién y hacia qué? , in: Cincuenta años de pensamiento 
en la CEPAL: textos seleccionados, Fondo de Cultura Económica Chile S.A., Santiago del Chile, 
1998 
 
 NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2007 
NRM 1.2007  Rinaldo Brau, Alessandro Lanza, and Francesco Pigliaru: How Fast are Small Tourism Countries Growing? 
The 1980-2003 Evidence 
PRCG 2.2007  C.V. Fiorio, M. Florio, S. Salini and P. Ferrari: Consumers’ Attitudes on Services of General Interest in the EU: 
Accessibility, Price and Quality 2000-2004 
PRCG 3.2007  Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility 
IEM 4.2007  Chiara Longo, Matteo Manera, Anil Markandya and Elisa Scarpa: Evaluating the Empirical Performance of 
Alternative Econometric Models for Oil Price Forecasting 
PRCG 5.2007  Bernardo Bortolotti, William Megginson and Scott B. Smart: The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equity 
Underwritings 
CCMP 6.2007  Valentina Bosetti and Massimo Tavoni: Uncertain R&D, Backstop Technology and GHGs Stabilization 
CCMP 7.2007  Robert Küster, Ingo Ellersdorfer, Ulrich Fahl (lxxxi): A CGE-Analysis of Energy Policies Considering Labor 
Market Imperfections and Technology Specifications 
CCMP 8.2007  Mònica Serrano (lxxxi): The Production and Consumption Accounting Principles as a Guideline for Designing 
Environmental Tax Policy 
CCMP 9.2007  Erwin L. Corong (lxxxi): Economic and Poverty Impacts of a Voluntary Carbon Reduction for a Small 
Liberalized Developing Economy: The Case of the Philippines 
CCMP 10.2007  Valentina Bosetti, Emanuele Massetti, and Massimo Tavoni: The WITCH Model. Structure, Baseline, Solutions 
SIEV 11.2007  Margherita Turvani, Aline Chiabai, Anna Alberini and Stefania Tonin: Public Policies for Contaminated Site 
Cleanup: The Opinions of the Italian Public 
CCMP 12.2007  M. Berrittella, A. Certa, M. Enea and P. Zito: An Analytic Hierarchy Process for The Evaluation of Transport 
Policies to Reduce Climate Change Impacts 
NRM 13.2007  Francesco Bosello, Barbara Buchner, Jacopo Crimi, Carlo Giupponi and Andrea Povellato: The Kyoto 
Protocol and the Effect of Existing and Planned Measures in the Agricultural and Forestry Sector in the EU25 
NRM 14.2007  Francesco Bosello, Carlo Giupponi and Andrea Povellato: A Review of Recent Studies on Cost Effectiveness of 
GHG Mitigation Measures in the European Agro-Forestry Sector 
CCMP 15.2007  Massimo Tavoni, Brent Sohngen, and Valentina Bosetti: Forestry and the Carbon Market Response to Stabilize 
Climate 
ETA 16.2007  Erik Ansink and Arjan Ruijs: Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements 
ETA 17.2007  François Gusdorf and Stéphane Hallegatte: Compact or Spread-Out Cities: Urban Planning, Taxation, and the 
Vulnerability to Transportation Shocks 
NRM 18.2007  Giovanni Bella: A Bug’s Life: Competition Among Species Towards the Environment 
IEM 19.2007  Valeria Termini and Laura Cavallo: “Spot, Bilateral and Futures Trading in Electricity Markets. Implications for 
Stability” 
ETA 20.2007  Stéphane Hallegatte and Michael Ghil: Endogenous Business Cycles and the Economic Response to Exogenous 
Shocks 
CTN 21.2007  Thierry Bréchet, François Gerard and Henry Tulkens: Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational 
Appraisal 
CCMP 22.2007  Claudia Kettner, Angela Köppl, Stefan P. Schleicher and Gregor Thenius: Stringency and Distribution  in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme –The 2005 Evidence 
NRM 23.2007  Hongyu Ding, Arjan Ruijs and Ekko C. van Ierland: Designing a Decision Support System for Marine Reserves 
Management: An Economic Analysis for the Dutch North Sea 
CCMP 24.2007  Massimiliano Mazzanti, Anna Montini and Roberto Zoboli: Economic Dynamics, Emission Trends and the EKC 
Hypothesis New Evidence Using NAMEA and Provincial Panel Data for Italy 
ETA 25.2007  Joan Canton: Redealing the Cards: How the Presence of an Eco-Industry Modifies the Political Economy of 
Environmental Policies 
ETA 26.2007  Joan Canton: Environmental Taxation and International Eco-Industries 
CCMP 27.2007  Oscar Cacho and Leslie Lipper (lxxxii): Abatement and Transaction Costs of Carbon-Sink Projects Involving 
Smallholders 
CCMP 28.2007  A. Caparrós, E. Cerdá, P. Ovando and P. Campos  (lxxxii): Carbon Sequestration with Reforestations and 
Biodiversity-Scenic Values 
CCMP 29.2007  Georg E. Kindermann, Michael Obersteiner, Ewald Rametsteiner and Ian McCallcum (lxxxii): Predicting the 
Deforestation–Trend Under Different Carbon–Prices CCMP 30.2007  Raul Ponce-Hernandez (lxxxii): A Modelling Framework for Addressing the Synergies between Global 
Conventions through Land Use Changes: Carbon Sequestration, Biodiversity Conservation, Prevention of Land 
Degradation and Food Security in Agricultural and Forested Lands in Developing Countries 
ETA 31.2007  Michele Moretto and Gianpaolo Rossini: Are Workers’ Enterprises Entry Policies Conventional 
KTHC 32.2007  Giacomo Degli Antoni: Do Social Relations Affect Economic Welfare? A Microeconomic Empirical Analysis 
CCMP 33.2007  Reyer Gerlagh and Onno Kuik: Carbon Leakage with International Technology Spillovers 
CCMP 34.2007  Richard S.J. Tol: The Impact of a Carbon Tax on International Tourism 
CCMP 35.2007  Reyer Gerlagh, Snorre Kverndokk and Knut Einar Rosendahl: Optimal Timing of Environmental Policy; 
Interaction Between Environmental Taxes and Innovation Externalitie 
SIEV 36.2007  Anna Alberini and Alberto Longo: Valuing the Cultural Monuments of Armenia: Bayesian Updating of Prior 
Beliefs in Contingent Valuation 
CCMP 37.2007  Roeland Bracke, Tom Verbeke and Veerle Dejonckheere: What Distinguishes EMAS Participants? An 
Exploration of Company Characteristics 
CCMP 38.2007  E. Tzouvelekas, D. Vouvaki and A. Xepapadeas: Total Factor Productivity Growth and the Environment: A Case 
for Green Growth Accounting 
CCMP 39.2007  Klaus Keller, Louise I. Miltich, Alexander Robinson and Richard S.J. Tol: How Overconfident are Current
Projections of Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions? 
CCMP 40.2007  Massimiliano Mazzanti
 
and Roberto Zoboli: Environmental Efficiency, Emission Trends and Labour 
Productivity: Trade-Off or Joint Dynamics? Empirical Evidence Using NAMEA Panel Data 
PRCG 41.2007  Veronica Ronchi: Populism and Neopopulism in Latin America: Clientelism, Trade Union Organisation and 
Electoral Support in Mexico and Argentina in the ‘90s 








(lxxxi) This paper was presented at the EAERE-FEEM-VIU Summer School on "Computable General 
Equilibrium Modeling in Environmental and Resource Economics", held in Venice from June 25th to 
July 1st, 2006 and supported by the Marie Curie Series of Conferences "European Summer School in 
Resource and Environmental Economics". 
(lxxxii) This paper was presented at the Workshop on “Climate Mitigation Measures in the Agro-Forestry 
Sector and Biodiversity Futures”, Trieste, 16-17 October 2006 and jointly organised by The Ecological 
and Environmental Economics - EEE Programme, The Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical 
Physics - ICTP, UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Programme - MAB, and The International Institute for 













  2007 SERIES 
  CCMP  Climate Change Modelling and Policy  (Editor: Marzio Galeotti ) 
  SIEV  Sustainability Indicators and Environmental Valuation (Editor: Anil Markandya) 
  NRM  Natural Resources Management  (Editor: Carlo Giupponi) 
  KTHC  Knowledge, Technology, Human Capital  (Editor: Gianmarco Ottaviano) 
  IEM  International Energy Markets (Editor: Matteo Manera) 
  CSRM  Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainable Management (Editor: Giulio Sapelli) 
  PRCG  Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance (Editor: Bernardo Bortolotti) 
  ETA  Economic Theory and Applications (Editor: Carlo Carraro) 
  CTN  Coalition Theory Network 
 